4cb70ce3e1fc0b23c857142e27ba4a7f45f38813
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Joakim Persson
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4cb70ce3e1 |
docs: record the 302 auth-redirect fingerprint and the server's exact HTTP surface
Phase 1 exposure now verified end to end (2026-08-12): /healthz -> ok and an unauthenticated POST /mcp -> 401, both from a client container and from the primary itself. 3.4 and 3.6 marked passed. Two findings from the failure in between, worth more than a checkbox: 1. Leaving Pangolin's resource authentication on does NOT surface as 401 or 403. It is a 302 with `location: https://pangolin.jordbo.se/auth/resource/<uuid> ?redirect=...`, sent *before* the request is proxied -- so the palace never sees it and its journal stays silent, `curl -s` prints an empty body, and an MCP client gets non-JSON. That is 1.1's "Pangolin's HTTP auth is browser-shaped; the clients are not" arriving as a concrete symptom rather than an argument. Now recorded with the exact header shape and the two curl flags that reveal it (-D-, -w '%{redirect_url}'), plus the reading: a 302 is good news, because DNS, TLS and routing all worked and only auth intervened. 2. Read the server's routing to settle whether path-scoped proxy rules are sufficient. The entire HTTP surface is two exact paths (mcp_server.py:5299- 5318): GET /healthz (no token, Host/Origin gated) and POST /mcp (Bearer, compare_digest on the exact string). Everything else is a 404 from the palace itself. So path-scoped rules are tighter than a host-wide proxy and lose nothing. Two client-facing consequences: /mcp is matched exactly, so a trailing slash 404s -- configure clients without one; and there is no GET /mcp, no SSE, no session id, no DELETE, so this is plain JSON-RPC over POST, not MCP streamable-HTTP. A strict client opening with a GET handshake sees 404. Also means the verify step needs no initialize and no Accept: text/event-stream, which the old snippet left ambiguous. Also: run the 200 and 401 from two different networks, not one -- passing from only the primary leaves split-horizon DNS untested. |
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Joakim Persson
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08e344b047 |
docs: proxy target is http:// not https://; loopback probe refuses, it does not 403
Both corrections come from the first real Phase 1 start on synlig (2026-08-12).
1. The Pangolin resource target was documented as bare `172.17.0.1:8765` with no
scheme, and the obvious guess from that is `https://` -- which cannot work.
`contrib/systemd/mempalace-serve.service` runs `serve --host 172.17.0.1
--port 8765` with no --tls-cert, so the primary speaks plaintext HTTP; TLS
terminates at Pangolin, which is the whole point of the RFC 6.2 decision.
Point a proxy at https:// and it attempts a TLS handshake against a plaintext
listener: 502 from outside, while `curl 172.17.0.1:8765/healthz` on the box
still says ok -- a confusing pair of symptoms. Now spelled `http://` with the
failure mode named, in the runbook and in the unit's comments.
2. `curl -s 127.0.0.1:8765/healthz` was documented as "expect 403". Wrong: the
real run returns empty. With a docker0-only bind nothing is listening on
loopback, so the connection is refused at TCP level before any header is sent
(%{http_code} -> 000, exit 7). The 403 is the *loopback-bind* case verified
2026-08-10 -- server on 127.0.0.1 answering a proxy-forwarded foreign Host.
Two distinct behaviours had been collapsed into one expectation in three
places (both runbooks and the unit).
Worth stating why the correction matters rather than just fixing it: refusal
is the *stronger* signal. A 403 proves only that a request was rejected; a
refused connection proves the loopback and LAN surface is not listening at
all. Someone who expected 403, saw silence, and "fixed" it by rebinding to
0.0.0.0 would have converted a correct configuration into an exposed one.
The docs now also say what to do if it hangs, or if ss shows 0.0.0.0:8765.
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Joakim Persson
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00a95d1a2f |
docs: why the tunnel and the feeder's SSH path are not redundant; newt done
Asked "why do we need Pangolin if you proposed rsync/ssh?", and the runbook did
not actually answer it -- it stated both were needed without saying why neither
substitutes. New section 1.3:
- Pangolin/HTTPS carries the MCP tool surface (search, add_drawer,
diary_write, kg_*) -- every live tool call, from any MCP client.
- SSH/rsync carries transcript *files* only, because mempalace_mine expands
its source path server-side, so the server can only mine its own disk.
HTTPS alone is a palace you can query but cannot feed; SSH alone is files with
no query API. The rsync is not a transport preference, it is a workaround for
where `mine` resolves paths.
Records honestly that `ssh -L 8765:172.17.0.1:8765 synlig` *would* replace the
tunnel for MCP, and why we don't: synlig dials out (reaching for a dial-out
tunnel is itself the evidence inbound was unavailable), MCP clients want a
durable URL rather than a per-session forward, and the forward must be up on
every device before every session.
And the design's weak point, stated instead of glossed: the rsync runs
client -> synlig, so mining needs synlig's SSH reachable *from the client*. Were
that true everywhere, no tunnel would be needed for MCP either. Honest
expectation after Phase 1 is therefore: query/write from anywhere, mine only
from devices that can reach synlig's SSH. Section 4 now carries the upstream ask
that would close the gap -- have the feeder send content over MCP (add_drawer /
diary_write, which it already calls) instead of asking the server to mine a path
it must first rsync there.
New section 3.7, a live trap for the imminent client flip:
MEMPALACE_REMOTE_URL on its own does not degrade to local feeding, it *stops*
feeding. auto mode switches to remote as soon as the URL is set (:286) and
remote mode then exits 1 without MEMPALACE_PI_SSH_TARGET (:298-300), before
anything is staged or filed -- so a cron feeder just starts failing, and the
loudest symptom is silence. Two safe orders given: set all three variables in
one edit, or set URL+token and pin --mode local until the SSH target exists.
newt is installed on synlig and connected to Pangolin (done 2026-08-12), marked
here and in the synlig runbook's item 2; the blocker is now item 3, the one
sudo. Added the follow-up that "connected to Pangolin" only proves newt reached
nyvaken -- reaching the *palace* is a separate claim that fails independently,
so probe 172.17.0.1:8765/healthz from inside newt's namespace.
All seven code citations verified against the source at commit time.
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Joakim Persson
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29e660e18f |
feeders: stage beside the palace, not in ~/.cache; document Phase 1 exposure
Staging default moves out of ~/.cache to <palace-root>/pi-stage (pi) and <palace-root>/opencode-stage (opencode), resolved with mempalace's own palace-path precedence ($MEMPALACE_PALACE_PATH -> $MEMPAL_PALACE_PATH -> ~/.mempalace/config.json -> ~/.mempalace/palace), then dirname. Why: the convos miner keys dedup on the *staged* path, so a wiped stage plus a sync scoped to include it prunes the drawers mined from those sources -- deleting memories, not a cache. Under ~/.cache that state was reachable by anything treating a cache as disposable. Staging inside the palace makes the coupling structural: the stage cannot be wiped without touching the palace itself. Overrides ($MEMPALACE_PI_STAGE / $MEMPALACE_SESSION_STAGE, --stage) are unchanged. Note the old default had never been created on any host, so this closed a latent hazard, not a live one. Measured, and the docs now claim only this much: sync prunes only within the scope it is given -- wing-only, 1299 scanned / 1299 out of scope / 0 removed; scoped at the palace root, 651 kept / 648 out of scope. The previous blanket "sync prunes every drawer" wording overstated it, which is a liability: the next reader disproves the overstatement and discards the real constraint with it. Also in this change: - cron log dir ~/.cache/mempalace-session -> ~/.cache/mempalace-logs. The stage left that namespace, so the old name now read as "the stage". - AGENTS.md: the convos miner *does* check mtime (verified against upstream convo_miner.py); the previous "no mtime check" claim was wrong. - smoke-test assertions use `mktemp -d` for --sessions-dir. One pointed at /tmp, which still held earlier synthetic transcripts, so a --dry-run exported a fake session into the real stage: --dry-run skips the mine, not the export. docs/phase-1-exposure-runbook.md -- the newt/DNS/auth step that RFC 001 and the synlig runbook leave open (runbook section 4, items 2 and 5). Port 8765 at /mcp, newt targets 172.17.0.1, and the authentication is the single shared bearer token (RFC 6.2, decided 2026-08-09) rather than per-device proxy users. The latter cannot work today: mempalace validates exactly one token, and Pangolin's SSO/PIN/password are browser-shaped while every client here is a headless JSON-RPC POST -- enabling that protection breaks the clients it protects. The per-device axis that *does* exist is the feeder's SSH key + per-device inbox. New finding recorded there: a loopback bind does not merely 403 behind a tunnel (already known, runbook 2.4) -- it also silently starts the server with no token at all, because auto-minting is gated on the bind being non-loopback. extensions/pi/README.md: the HTTP transport IS authenticated as of mempalace 3.6.0; the "sessionless and unauthenticated" note dated from the v1.3.0 era. Closes the RFC section 8 Phase-0 hygiene item. |