1 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
pi	553d86570c	provenance: stamp device+harness at the edge, not in the agent's head ... RFC 001 §7.3.2 ranks "agent stamps provenance via a skill instruction" as the ❌ worst possible place — per-call boilerplate, forgettable, improvisable. It was right, and we had shipped exactly that: the mempalace skill told the agent to pass added_by="<harness>@<device>" by hand. Measured on the shared palace, 199 rows had reached it unresolvable, 10 of them filed by the very agent that wrote the instruction, in a drawer about host provenance. The trigger was a cross-host misattribution: a session on tor-ms22 read its own diary, could not tell that the entries were written on EMB-7KJ4VR4G, and reported another machine's verification as this one's. Move the same convention into the ⚠️ edge row, where it is uniform and unforgettable (§7.3.5): * extensions/pi/mempalace.ts defaults the writer field on every tool that has one — added_by (add_drawer, checkpoint), agent (mine), from_agent (event_append), created_by (artifact_put) — from $MEMPALACE_PI_DEVICE. An explicit value always wins, so filing for another device stays possible. The allowlist is per tool, never blanket: 3.8.0's dispatcher hard-rejects undeclared args with -32602, so injecting added_by into diary_write or kg_add (which have no such property) would break the call outright. * mine gets miner@<device> when the caller invokes it, but <harness>@<device> for the bridge's own transcript feed — bulk extraction is not agent-authored memory, and that keeps the pi/opencode/miner taxonomy honest. * diary_write has no metadata slot at all, and the device must never go in agent_name (wing = f"wing_{agent_name}" would splinter the diary per host). So the entry TEXT carries an AAAK field, HOST:<device>|SESSION:… — which is also the only channel a READER sees: search projects a fixed key set and diary_read returns content, so no metadata fix, not even a server-authoritative one, would have prevented the misattribution. * The wake-up block now states the device and warns that diary_read interleaves every machine's diary. * R1: doubly gated on MEMPALACE_PI_DEVICE and MEMPALACE_REMOTE_URL, so a solitary devbox stamps nothing and behaves exactly as before — which is also the correct semantics per §7.3.3. Version the reconciler that was living only on synlig (bin/ + contrib/systemd/), add --dry-run, and teach it two new rules: diary_host_marker reads the HOST: field, and sibling_chunk propagates a resolved origin across a drawer's chunks (a text marker lands in chunk 0 only, so a 5-chunk diary entry would otherwise stamp 1 and leave 4 blank). --dry-run against the real palace before deploying earned its keep twice, and scripts/test-device-stamp.sh pins both findings with the strings it found: HOST: was ALREADY in use with a composite grammar (HOST:emb-7kj4vr4g.f1d3c3f89e3e.v1.8.3.pi0.84.2) and for bare container ids, so an unvalidated rule invented devices like "f1d3c3f89e3e.pi0.84.2"; and HOST: also carries a different SENSE elsewhere (HOST:exec.via.ssh-controlmaster->…, meaning where I was executing). Validating against the known-device set both refuses those and recovers the composite entries correctly. A marker convention inherits every prior meaning of its own name. Deployed and verified on synlig: device 14,217 → 14,317, integrity ok, idempotent on immediate re-run, no invented device values. RFC updates: §7.3.1 corrected (the arg whitelist is a hard -32602 in 3.8.0, not a silent drop; get_drawer DOES return metadata, search structurally cannot; triples and logstream live in separate databases the stamper cannot reach), §7.3.5 added (what is deployed, including the divergence from §7.3.4's opaque origin_device — tor-ms22 vs tor-ms22-native is that cost already visible), and Phase 4 now carries per-device tokens motivated FIRST by revocation, with the finding that tokens are the cheap half: core holds one scalar auth_token and has zero device concept, so authoritative stamping needs a component we own.	2026-08-25 22:26:46 +02:00