mempalace: drop the stage ENV pin, fix the shared-server compose
The feeder now defaults to <palace-root>/pi-stage upstream, so pinning
MEMPALACE_PI_STAGE into ~/.pi here is unnecessary -- and was actively wrong. It
created a second convention that could still diverge from the palace: keep the
devbox-palace volume, drop devbox-pi-config, and a scoped `mempalace sync`
prunes every conversation drawer, because dedup keys on the staged path. Both
the ENV and the entrypoint export are gone; a comment explains why adding one
back re-introduces the split it was meant to fix.
docker-compose.mempalace.yml was broken on mempalace 3.6.0 in both directions:
- `--host 0.0.0.0` with no token in the environment makes the server refuse
to start, crash-looping under `restart: unless-stopped`.
- Supply a token and the healthcheck's unauthenticated `tools/list` POST 401s,
marking a perfectly healthy server unhealthy forever.
Now the token is required via ${MEMPALACE_REMOTE_TOKEN:?...} so it fails fast at
`docker compose up` with a readable message, and the healthcheck probes the
deliberately token-free /healthz. The "no authentication of its own" security
note has been stale since 3.6.0 and is replaced with the actual posture
(bearer token + Host pin + Origin allowlist), including why browser-shaped auth
must not be put in front of it.
Dockerfile.base: mempalace-pi-session symlinked onto PATH, with a build-time
`--help` check so a broken feeder fails the image build rather than the first
session.
smoke-test: assert the stage resolves beside the palace (default, and following
$MEMPALACE_PALACE_PATH) instead of asserting the removed ENV pin. The two
behavioural guards -- a synthetic session that must be captured, an abandoned
one that must not be -- are unchanged.
.env.example: recommend `mempalace serve` on the docker0 gateway rather than
`mempalace-mcp --transport http --host 0.0.0.0`, with the two binds to avoid.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
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# Point every client at it by setting, in that client's .env:
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#
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# MEMPALACE_REMOTE_URL=http://<reachable-host>:8765/mcp
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# MEMPALACE_REMOTE_TOKEN=<the shared bearer token>
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#
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# (see .env.example). When set, the client connects over HTTP and does NOT
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# spawn its own local mempalace-mcp.
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@@ -18,12 +19,21 @@
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# (both are pinned by the same image build). Override with a slimmer image via
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# MEMPALACE_SERVER_IMAGE if you prefer (it must provide `mempalace-mcp`).
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#
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# ⚠ SECURITY: mempalace-mcp's HTTP transport has NO authentication of its own.
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# Do NOT expose port 8765 to an untrusted network. The default below binds to
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# 127.0.0.1 (host loopback) only. To let sibling containers reach it, either
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# attach them to the shared `mempalace-net` network (container-to-container, no
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# host port needed — use http://mempalace-server:8765/mcp), or front it with a
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# reverse proxy that enforces MEMPALACE_REMOTE_TOKEN as `Authorization: Bearer`.
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# ⚠ SECURITY: the HTTP transport IS authenticated as of mempalace 3.6.0 — an
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# earlier version of this comment said otherwise and was wrong. The server
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# compares `Authorization: Bearer <token>` with hmac.compare_digest and
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# **refuses to start on a non-loopback bind without a token**, so
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# MEMPALACE_REMOTE_TOKEN below is required, not optional: without it this
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# service crash-loops. It also pins `Host` and allowlists `Origin`.
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#
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# Still do not publish port 8765 to an untrusted network. The default binds to
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# 127.0.0.1 (host loopback) only. To let sibling containers reach it, attach
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# them to the shared `mempalace-net` network (container-to-container, no host
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# port needed — use http://mempalace-server:8765/mcp). To reach it from
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# elsewhere, terminate TLS in a tunnel/reverse proxy and let the bearer token be
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# the authentication — do NOT add browser-shaped auth (SSO/PIN/password) in
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# front, because every MCP client here is a headless JSON-RPC POST and would
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# receive a login page where JSON should be.
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name: mempalace-server
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@@ -40,6 +50,11 @@ services:
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user: "0:0"
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environment:
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- HOME=/data
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# Required: mempalace refuses a non-loopback bind without a token (it
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# would exit at startup and, with restart:unless-stopped, crash-loop).
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# `:?` fails fast at `docker compose up` with a readable message instead.
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# Clients send the same value as MEMPALACE_REMOTE_TOKEN.
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- MEMPALACE_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN=${MEMPALACE_REMOTE_TOKEN:?set MEMPALACE_REMOTE_TOKEN in .env — the shared palace requires a bearer token}
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command:
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- mempalace-mcp
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- --transport
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@@ -60,16 +75,28 @@ services:
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- mempalace-shared:/data/.mempalace
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# Embedding-model cache (~79 MB, disposable) so search does not re-download.
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- mempalace-shared-chroma:/data/.cache/chroma
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# Transcript inbox. Clients cannot mine into a remote palace directly:
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# `mempalace_mine` expands its source path in THIS process, so it can only
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# see paths inside this container. Each client rsyncs its staged session
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# exports to a per-device subdirectory on the host (see
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# MEMPALACE_PI_SSH_TARGET in .env.example) and then calls mempalace_mine
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# with the container-side path below (MEMPALACE_PI_REMOTE_PATH=/data/feed).
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# Read-only: mining only reads sources, and all locks live palace-side.
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- ${MEMPALACE_FEED_DIR:-./feed}:/data/feed:ro
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networks:
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- mempalace-net
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healthcheck:
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# A tools/list round-trip proves the server is answering MCP (python3 is
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# always present — mempalace itself is a python tool in the image).
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# GET /healthz, which is Host/Origin-gated but deliberately token-free —
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# so this probe needs no credentials. Do NOT go back to POSTing
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# `tools/list` here: that carries no Authorization header and now 401s,
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# marking a perfectly healthy server unhealthy forever. The Host pin is
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# only enforced on loopback *binds* (this one is 0.0.0.0), so a request to
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# 127.0.0.1 inside the container passes.
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test:
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- CMD
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- python3
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- -c
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- "import urllib.request,json; d=json.dumps({'jsonrpc':'2.0','id':1,'method':'tools/list','params':{}}).encode(); r=urllib.request.Request('http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp',data=d,headers={'Content-Type':'application/json','Accept':'application/json'}); urllib.request.urlopen(r,timeout=5).read()"
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- "import urllib.request,sys; sys.exit(0 if urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8765/healthz',timeout=5).status==200 else 1)"
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interval: 30s
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timeout: 10s
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retries: 3
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