release: adopt pi 0.84.4 + pi-atelier v0.10.0, and fix the doc claim the pi bump invalidates

pi 0.84.3 -> 0.84.4 (no Breaking Changes / Removed heading in that section,
grepped). Adopted for three fixes that land on machinery this fleet runs:
#6879 (large tool results crossing the auto-compaction threshold were sent to
the provider before compacting), #8345 (a resumed session corrupted its next
appended entry when the JSONL lacked a trailing newline -- that file is the
memory feeder's input; measured 49/49 clean here beforehand), and #8537
(triggerTurn:false messages sent mid-run were inserted between a tool call and
its result). The mempalace mailbox is outside #8537's precondition: it delivers
at agent_settled with deliverAs:"steer" and no triggerTurn, and 0.84.4 leaves
the documented steer semantics unchanged.

pi-atelier v0.8.2 -> v0.10.0: two minor releases, both UI-only, no BREAKING
notice. v0.9.0 raises its minimum pi to 0.84.0 and, unlike the
0.7.1-under-pi-0.84 startup-hang precedent, encodes it in peerDependencies
(>=0.84.0). Satisfied by PI_VERSION=0.84.4. Both executable floors compare with
sort -V, so 0.10.0 >= 0.7.1 evaluates correctly.

docs/observational-memory.md: pi's own compaction.md gained one paragraph in
0.84.4 -- autoCompact is now also checked mid-run, after a tool batch's results
are appended. Our text said compaction is checked only when pi goes idle and so
"never interrupts a turn"; that was only ever true of the OM trigger. The
section now states both entry points into session_before_compact and the
diagram carries the second edge (mermaid checker re-run: 6 blocks, 44 labels,
0 soft-wrapped, no cut glyphs at 1280px and 800px).

README: the version-pin table had been wrong since v1.8.6 -- 93f986e moved
ARG PI_VERSION to 0.84.3 and MEMPALACE_VERSION to 3.8.0 and neither table row,
so it advertised pi 0.84.2 / mempalace 3.7.1. Corrected, plus the
--expected-version example that would now fail against a 0.84.4 image.

CHANGELOG: Unreleased retitled v1.8.12 (2026-08-31) with the audits above and a
dependency-audit table -- every other component measured SAME (skillset
snapshot --check OK at a12fe5e, 0 commits since baked).

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -11,6 +11,308 @@ Pre-v1.0.0 tags followed the pi npm version (`v{pi_version}[letter]`).
 
 ---
 
+## v1.8.12 — 2026-08-31
+
+**`pi` `0.84.3` → `0.84.4`, and `pi-atelier` `v0.8.2` → `v0.10.0`.** Both audited
+by the routine in `Dockerfile.variant` rather than adopted on sight, and the
+audit notes live next to the pins where the next reader will meet them.
+
+**pi 0.84.4 (published 2026-08-28) carries no `Breaking Changes` and no
+`Removed` heading** — checked by grepping the section, 0 matches, which is worth
+stating because 0.84.3 *did* have one. It was adopted for three fixes that land
+on machinery this fleet runs every day, not for the feature list:
+
+- **#6879** — a large tool result crossing the auto-compaction threshold used to
+  be sent to the provider *before* compaction. Pi now compacts between tool
+  execution and the next assistant response inside the same run. That is the
+  shape of nearly every session on these boxes, where a single `event_list` or
+  palace search returns hundreds of KB.
+- **#8345** — a resumed session corrupted its next appended entry when the JSONL
+  file lacked a trailing newline. That file is the memory feeder's *input*, so
+  the failure would have surfaced as unexplained gaps in `wing_conversations`
+  rather than as an error. Measured on tor-ms22 before bumping: 49/49
+  transcripts end in a newline and 0 lines fail `json.loads` — this corpus was
+  never bitten, and we now know that rather than hope it.
+- **#8537** — extension messages sent with `triggerTurn: false` *while the agent
+  is running* were inserted between a tool call and its result, so
+  order-validating providers rejected the replayed history. **The mempalace
+  mailbox is outside that precondition**: it delivers at `agent_settled`, when
+  no inference is in flight, with `{deliverAs: "steer"}` and deliberately no
+  `triggerTurn`. 0.84.4 also leaves the documented steer semantics untouched
+  ("delivered after the current assistant turn finishes executing its tool
+  calls, before the next LLM call"), so RFC 003 §7.11 stands as written. Recorded
+  because this fix is precisely what would make a *mid-run* delivery safe, which
+  is the only reason we would ever change that call.
+
+Also new and relevant, though nothing here uses them yet: `ui_prompt_start` /
+`ui_prompt_end` extension events (the `docs/extensions.md` diff is add-only — no
+steer or `triggerTurn` semantics moved), and an RPC `clear_queue` that returns
+and removes queued steering messages. The second one can discard an
+already-delivered but unconsumed mailbox steer; that is survivable because the
+mailbox re-delivers on `MEMPALACE_MAILBOX_RESURFACE_MS` (default 3600000), and it
+is written down here so a future "the mailbox lost a message" report has a
+candidate cause. The three new `PI_HYPERLINKS` / `PI_IMAGE_PROTOCOL` /
+`PI_TRUE_COLOR` environment variables were grepped against this whole repo: no
+collisions with anything the image sets.
+
+**The bump moved one documented mechanism, so `docs/observational-memory.md` §3
+moved with it.** Pi's own `docs/compaction.md` gained exactly one paragraph in
+0.84.4: the `autoCompact` threshold is now *also* checked mid-run, after a tool
+batch's results are appended and before the next assistant response, skipped only
+when that batch ends the run and no queued message needs another response. Our
+doc said compaction is "checked when pi goes idle, so it never interrupts a
+turn". That was only ever true of observational-memory's **own** trigger
+(`compaction-trigger.ts` hooks `agent_settled`); read as a statement about pi it
+is now false. `session_before_compact` (`compaction-hook.ts`) therefore has
+**two** entry points and the second can fire inside a turn — harmless for the
+ledger fold, which makes no model call, but a doc that ships a false promise
+about when a hook runs is worse than one that admits two paths. The §3 mermaid
+diagram gained the second edge, and the whole file re-passes the bundled mermaid
+checker (6 blocks, 44 labels, 0 soft-wrapped, no cut glyphs at 1280px and
+800px).
+
+**pi-atelier `v0.8.2` → `v0.10.0` is two minor releases and both are UI-only** —
+Sidebar kept calm during an active Turn, composer frame and Status Rail polish,
+fullscreen-copy-safe Sidebar, Windows path normalisation, Workspace Pulse
+deferred until pi trusts the project. Neither release carries a BREAKING notice.
+The coupling that matters runs the *opposite* way to this pin's hard-earned
+floor: v0.9.0 renders the Sidebar as a separate split-layout child and therefore
+"raises the minimum supported Pi version to 0.84.0", and — unlike the
+0.7.1-under-pi-0.84 startup-hang precedent, which its metadata never encoded —
+this time `peerDependencies` says so (`>=0.84.0`, up from `>=0.80.7`). Satisfied
+with room to spare by `PI_VERSION=0.84.4`. It also pairs deliberately with a
+0.84.4 feature: atelier keeps Sidebar content out of the fullscreen transcript
+selection while pi adds `fullscreenCopyOnSelect` and Ctrl+X for the selection
+itself. Both executable floors (`scripts/smoke-test.sh`,
+`scripts/recreate-sanity-check.sh`) compare with `sort -V`, so `0.10.0 >= 0.7.1`
+is evaluated correctly — verified by running the comparison, because the string
+form of that test reads `0.10.0` as *older* than `0.7.1`.
+
+**While bumping the pins, the README's own pin table turned out to have been
+wrong since v1.8.6.** It advertised pi `0.84.2` and mempalace `3.7.1` in the very
+table whose purpose is to tell a reader what is pinned and where. Both rows went
+stale in the *same* commit — `93f986e` (v1.8.6, "adopt pi 0.84.3 + mempalace
+3.8.0") moved both `ARG`s and neither table row; the rows themselves date from
+`29b6209` (v1.8.0) and `2ebf00d` (v1.8.4). Only atelier's row was still true.
+All three corrected now, and the `--expected-version 0.84.3` example in the
+recreate-sanity section updated too, since that one is a copy-pasteable command
+that would now fail against a 0.84.4 image. Worth noting how it survived two
+releases: nothing checks prose against the `ARG`s, so this table has to be
+remembered by hand on every pin bump, and once it was not.
+
+**`credential-incident-response` gained the section its own guidance had been
+missing, and §2 gained a precondition it should always have carried.** Docs only;
+no image behaviour moves. Both changes came out of a session where three separate
+detectors reported *clean* over secrets that were really there — the skill was
+the artifact that had taught two agents the pattern, so the fix belongs here
+rather than in either operator's private notes.
+
+**§2 previously said an 8-hex fingerprint lets you compare a credential "without
+ever materialising the secret", with no condition attached.** That is true only
+when the *input space* is unreachable. A fingerprint is 32 bits over whatever it
+was computed from, so publishing `fp8(x)` hands anyone a **membership oracle**:
+they can test `x == v` for every candidate `v` they can generate. For a 40-char
+random token, fine. For a hostname, username, e-mail, port, path, commit SHA or
+weak password, that candidate set is a wordlist — and note that "high entropy" is
+the usual sufficient condition, not the test: a commit SHA is 160-bit and still
+fully enumerable from the repo. Two agents on this fleet published fingerprints of
+`GIT_USER_EMAIL`-class values while following this section as written; harmless in
+that instance, because those values sit in every commit trailer already, but the
+guidance licensed it. §2 now states the precondition, adds that candidate
+fingerprints are working memory and never output (a scanner hashes hostnames and
+paths too, so "print what it saw" leaks wholesale), and names what a fingerprint
+register *is* — a confirmation oracle for anyone already holding a candidate
+corpus, which is exactly how a retired token gets identified in old transcripts,
+and works the same way for someone else holding those files.
+
+**New §6, "Proving absence: instrument strength, and four ways a scan lies
+clean".** Deliberately placed next to §5, because §5 optimises against false
+*positives* (name-anchoring, provenance — what stops a triage sweep drowning in
+session UUIDs) and every failure in §6 is a false *negative*. Triage optimises
+precision; a gate optimises recall, and conflating the two is what produced the
+clean reports. It carries: an instrument-strength ranking (exact-byte value search
+> class/structure pass > fingerprint census) with the standing instruction to say
+which one produced your zero; census and class passes answering different
+questions, with both failure modes measured here — a class-only pre-commit hook
+passed plaintext UUID API credentials to a shared repo twice because a UUID has no
+key header, while a census-only gate reported 0 hits with freshly-synced SSH
+private keys in the tree because no key is in the census; the tokenisation trap,
+where maximal-run extraction swallows an unquoted `VAR=<uuid>` so the value is
+never hashed alone while a *quoted* one is found, meaning quoting alone decided
+detectability; scan the index or the pushed tree, never the working tree, plus why
+a repo-only fix on an rsync-published mirror is temporary rather than weaker; git
+filters never running on symlinks, where `check-attr` answers `git-crypt` for a
+path it can never encrypt, so a coverage audit must join the attribute against the
+file mode and verify the blob magic; two-sided self-tests that abort, including
+the fixture-interaction artifact where a quoted and unquoted probe share one
+buffer and make the weak extractor look as strong as the union; and row-gone is
+not bytes-gone, since a correct sqlite DELETE leaves the payload in freelist pages
+until VACUUM.
+
+Findings contributed by `pi@emb-7kj4vr4g` (the census/class split, and the
+instrument ranking's provenance) and `pi@tor-ms22` (exact-byte value search over
+index blobs). The description's trigger list grew accordingly and is 1022/1024
+characters — **it has almost no headroom, so trim before adding to it**, or the
+skill silently fails to load.
+
+**Deployment:** the skill is baked at
+`/usr/local/share/pi-devbox/skills/credential-incident-response/`, so this needs
+an image rebuild **and** a container recreate to reach any running container.
+
+**Two vendored skills changed, and one of the changes is a correction rather than
+an addition.** Nothing about the image's behaviour moves; this is entirely about
+what the next agent reads before it acts.
+
+**`pi-devbox-environment` §2 had a rule that was half wrong, and the wrong half
+cost five findings in one session.** The section "A negative result is usually
+your own filter" closed with *"a positive result needs no such scepticism — it
+carries its own evidence."* That sentence is false. A positive result is evidence
+about the question your command *actually posed*, which may not be the question
+you meant — and the failure is invisible precisely because the command succeeded.
+Three measured instances, all from 2026-08-29, all filed as fact before being
+caught: an SSH handshake that succeeded and greeted the agent as `joakimp` while
+it believed it was probing `gitea.egl.lan` (a `Host gitea*` block had rewritten
+`HostName`, so it authenticated to the wrong Gitea instance); a `401` that was a
+genuine answer from an issuer which had never minted the credential being tested;
+and a "regression" produced by diffing `ssh -G` output against a `2222` that the
+agent's own earlier `-p 2222` flag had supplied. The section now carries a
+counterpart, *"…and a positive result only proves what you actually asked"*, plus
+the three false-negative rows that session added (a palace scan that queried
+`embedding_metadata` while documents live in `embedding_fulltext_search_content`;
+a token declared dead on a 401 from the wrong issuer; a host declared unreachable
+after trying two of its three open ports, with the port written in an environment
+variable the agent already held).
+
+**The cross-cutting form of that rule went into `pi-global-AGENTS.append.md`, not
+into the skill — deliberately, and this is the whole point of the change.** The
+rule *already existed* in the baked skill, authored by an earlier session,
+symlinked into `~/.agents/skills/` at every container start. It survived every
+recreate, was available for the entire session that broke it, and was violated
+five times anyway. So the gap was never persistence; it was **activation**.
+A reasoning rule that only loads when a task description happens to match it
+cannot fire on the occasions that need it, because "I am about to state something
+false" is not a recognisable task type. The always-appended block is read by every
+agent in every container without being asked for, which is the only property that
+matters here. Writing a sixth document restating the rule would have felt like
+progress and changed nothing.
+
+**New baked skill: `credential-incident-response`.** Authored here, so the baked
+copy is canonical and it is *not* listed in `skillset-owned.txt`. It carries the
+*facts* a two-day credential incident produced, on the theory that facts transfer
+between sessions where exhortations do not: probe the issuing provider **first**
+(11 of 13 "exposed" credentials in that sweep turned out to be already dead at the
+provider — five HTTP requests would have established it, and nobody asked);
+`sha256[:8]` fingerprints as leak-free credential identity; the `403`-vs-`401`
+trap that scoped tokens introduce into liveness probes, where a live token looks
+revoked on `/api/v1/user`; **revocation beats deletion** for anything already
+replicated, because deletion is best-effort over an unbounded copy set (FTS shadow
+rows, per-host feed inboxes, sqlite free pages, mesh replicas, backups) while
+revocation invalidates copies nobody enumerated; the three places a secret hides
+in a Chroma palace, in coverage order; deriving least-privilege scopes from
+*measured* consumers; and the exposures rotation does not fix (cleartext channels,
+git history, agent-authored drawers).
+
+**Three smoke assertions extended** so a rebuild cannot silently drop the new
+skill: baked-file existence, resolves-to-the-baked-tree, and reported as `baked`
+by `pi-devbox-version`. Skill directories are picked up by a glob in
+`entrypoint-user.sh`, so no registration was needed — verified rather than
+assumed, since an enumerated list would have left the skill inert, which would
+have been a fitting way for *this* skill to fail.
+
+Neither skills change reaches a running container until the image is rebuilt **and**
+the container recreated: `~/.agents/skills/` and the global `AGENTS.md` both live in
+the image, not in a volume or a mount.
+
+**`cli_utils`' shell *functions* are now sourced, closing the half of that wiring
+the image never did.** v1.8.11 linked the repo's `bin/` **commands** into
+`~/.local/bin` so they resolve in non-interactive shells; nothing ever sourced
+`cli_utils.sh`, so its 14 **functions** (`fgit`, `fhist`, `fssh`, `fdocker`,
+`fmark`, `fproc`, `fex`, `fenv`, `extract`, `mkcd`, `pathls`, `portcheck`,
+`agents-sync`, `up`) were missing from every interactive shell whose `$HOME` had
+no zsh rc. That is the normal case, not an edge case: the container's interactive
+shell is bash and **zsh is not installed in the image**. A symlink cannot carry a
+shell function and a function cannot be reached from a non-interactive shell, so
+the two mechanisms are disjoint and both are required — the image had been paying
+this layer's dependency cost (`fzf`, `bat`, `fd`, `rg`, `jq` are baked partly *for*
+these functions) while delivering none of its benefit. Now sourced from
+`/etc/skel-devbox/.bash_aliases`, with the same detection order as the symlink
+block so commands and functions can never come from two different clones.
+`CLI_UTILS_SOURCE=0` opts out, deliberately independent of `CLI_UTILS_LINK=0`
+because the two disable independent mechanisms. Measured: all 14 resolve in a
+freshly-seeded `$HOME`, the opt-out is honoured, an absent checkout is a genuinely
+silent no-op (no output, no leaked `_cu` variable), and interactive shell startup
+goes from 12 ms to 17 ms.
+
+**Named explicitly, per this repo's own floating-ref rule: `/workspace/cli_utils`
+is a host bind mount, not a pinned ref.** Sourcing it means the image now executes
+content it does not pin, on every interactive shell, on every device. It is
+bash-safe today and that was measured rather than assumed — sourcing under
+`bash --noprofile --norc` exits 0 and defines all 14 despite the `*.zsh`
+filenames, the functions run, and the tree's single zsh-only construct (`print -z`
+in `fzf/fhist.zsh`) is already guarded by `[[ -n $ZSH_VERSION ]]` with a bash
+fallback. The residual risk is future content: a cli_utils commit adding a
+genuinely zsh-only file would surface as parse errors at every prompt, fleet-wide.
+Errors are therefore left visible rather than sent to `/dev/null`, so the failure
+is diagnosable, and `CLI_UTILS_SOURCE=0` is the one-line escape hatch.
+
+**`iproute2` is installed, so the container can answer "what is listening in
+here".** Neither `ss` nor `ip` was present in any image up to and including
+v1.8.11 — nor `lsof`, nor `netstat` — which made `cli_utils`' `portcheck` a hard
+stub that printed `portcheck requires at least one of: ss, lsof, netstat` and
+exited. `ss` satisfies its preferred branch (`ss -tlnp`), which is also the only
+branch that reports the owning PID. `net-tools` is deliberately **not** added
+(`netstat` is deprecated and only a fallback path) and neither is `lsof` (~500 KB
+for a third route to the same answer). Cost measured, not estimated: ~5.5 MB total
+— `iproute2` is 4.2 MB and pulls six libs under `--no-install-recommends`
+(`libbpf1`, `libmnl0`, `libtirpc-common`, `libtirpc3t64`, `libxtables12`,
+`libcap2-bin`; `libpam-cap` is a Recommends and is correctly dropped). Verified in
+a live container: `ss` at `/usr/bin/ss`, `ip` at `/usr/sbin/ip`, both already on
+the developer `PATH`, and `portcheck --all` then correctly identifies the `socat`
+listener on 8765.
+
+The two changes above also need a rebuild **and** a recreate, for a different
+reason than the skills: `$HOME` is the container's writable layer rather than a
+named volume (verified — `~/.bash_aliases` carries the container's start mtime
+while `~/.bashrc` carries the image's), so the skel file is re-seeded on every
+recreate. A `$HOME/.bash_aliases` that is bind-mounted from the host is still
+never overwritten, which is the existing contract.
+
+### Dependency audit (2026-08-31)
+
+Every component checked against upstream by direct command, not assumed:
+
+| Component | Baked in v1.8.11 | Upstream now | Action |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **pi** | `0.84.3` (pinned) | **`0.84.4`** is npm latest | bumped + audited (above) |
+| **pi-atelier** | `v0.8.2` (pinned) | **`v0.10.0`** highest tag | bumped + audited (above) |
+| mempalace | `3.8.0` (pinned) | `3.8.0` is PyPI latest | none |
+| skillset (mempalace fallback snapshot) | `a12fe5e` | `a12fe5e` == `origin/main`, 0 commits since | none — `--check` reports OK, no NOTICE |
+| mempalace-toolkit | `21023e7` | `21023e7` | none |
+| pi-toolkit | `0e1369e` | `0e1369e` | none |
+| pi-extensions | `2022887` | `2022887` | none |
+| pi-fork | `bf702b4` | `bf702b4` | none |
+| pi-observational-memory | `ce9fc98` | `ce9fc98` (v3.0.4, peerDeps `*` → no pi floor to clear) | none |
+| pi-studio (studio variant) | `3328b3d` | `3328b3d` | none |
+| floating `*_VERSION=latest` tools (16) | — | 14 already at latest; `git-lfs` `3.7.1`→`3.8.0` (feature, no breaking section), `uv` `0.12.6`→`0.12.7` (patch) | adopted implicitly by the rebuild; named here per this repo's floating-ref rule |
+| node | major pin `22`, installed `v22.23.2` | `v22.23.2` is the newest 22.x | none — a newer LTS *line* (24.x) exists and is deliberately not tracked |
+
+Two method notes, because both would have produced a confident wrong answer:
+
+- **An annotated tag's `ls-remote` SHA is the tag object, not the commit.**
+  `refs/tags/v0.8.2` is `6e07bf85` while `refs/tags/v0.8.2^{}` is `159f34cf` —
+  the value actually baked. Comparing the un-dereferenced form reported
+  `pi-atelier` as *drifted from its own pin*, which would have been a false
+  integrity alarm about the one component whose pin is load-bearing. Always
+  deref with `^{}` before calling a pin broken.
+- **`git ls-remote --tags | sort -V | tail` is not a "latest release" proxy.**
+  `typst/typst` carries date-style tags (`v23-03-28`) and `mikefarah/yq` carries
+  `vTestA`/`vTestB`; both sort *after* the real releases. `Dockerfile.base`
+  itself resolves `latest` by reading the `Location` of
+  `curl -sI …/releases/latest`, so replaying that exact step is both
+  noise-immune and the same source of truth the build will see.
+
+---
+
 ## v1.8.11 — 2026-08-27
 
 **Shell state that the writable layer eats on every recreate now gets rebuilt at

Dockerfile.base

@@ -83,6 +83,24 @@ ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
 #                  above); TERM=xterm-ghostty is compiled from an alias further
 #                  down (ncurses ships `ghostty`, not `xterm-ghostty`). iTerm2
 #                  defaults to xterm-256color (ncurses-base), so needs nothing.
+#   iproute2     — `ss` (socket statistics) and `ip`. Measured 2026-08-30 on
+#                  v1.8.11: NEITHER was present, so the container could not
+#                  answer "what is listening in here" by any means, and
+#                  cli_utils' `portcheck` was a hard stub — it prints
+#                  "portcheck requires at least one of: ss, lsof, netstat" and
+#                  all three were absent. `ss` satisfies its preferred branch
+#                  (`ss -tlnp`), which is also the branch that reports the
+#                  owning PID, so nothing further is needed: net-tools is
+#                  deliberately NOT added (`netstat` is deprecated and only a
+#                  fallback branch) and neither is lsof (~500 KB for a third
+#                  path to the same answer). ~5.5 MB total: iproute2 itself is
+#                  4.2 MB and pulls 6 libs under --no-install-recommends
+#                  (libbpf1, libmnl0, libtirpc-common, libtirpc3t64,
+#                  libxtables12, libcap2-bin — libpam-cap is a Recommends and
+#                  is correctly dropped). Verified end-to-end in a live
+#                  container: `ss` lands at /usr/bin/ss, `ip` at /usr/sbin/ip
+#                  (both already on the developer PATH), and `portcheck --all`
+#                  then correctly identifies the socat listener on 8765.
 RUN apt-get update && \
     apt-get upgrade -y --no-install-recommends && \
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
@@ -122,6 +140,7 @@ RUN apt-get update && \
     nano \
     kitty-terminfo \
     ncurses-term \
+    iproute2 \
     && ln -s /usr/bin/fdfind /usr/local/bin/fd \
     && apt-get clean \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

Dockerfile.variant

@@ -57,6 +57,32 @@ ARG USER_NAME=developer
 # v0.74.0..v0.75.5; discovered + fixed in v0.75.5b, 2026-05-23). The `latest`
 # branch below is kept only for a deliberate local `docker build` override.
 #
+# AUDITED AT 0.84.4 (2026-08-31, was 0.84.3): NO "Breaking Changes" and no
+# "Removed" heading in the 0.84.4 section (grepped, 0 matches) — unlike 0.84.3,
+# whose heading is described in the paragraph below and stays audited. Adopted
+# for three fixes that land on machinery this fleet actually runs:
+#   - #6879 large tool results crossing the auto-compaction threshold were sent
+#     to the provider BEFORE compacting; pi now compacts between tool execution
+#     and the next assistant response in the same run. This is the shape of
+#     nearly every session here (multi-hundred-KB logstream/palace tool output).
+#   - #8345 a resumed session corrupted its next appended entry when the JSONL
+#     lacked a trailing newline. That file is the memory feeder's own input.
+#     Measured on tor-ms22 before the bump: 49/49 transcripts end in a newline,
+#     0 lines fail json.loads — the bug had not bitten this corpus.
+#   - #8537 extension messages sent with `triggerTurn: false` WHILE THE AGENT IS
+#     RUNNING were inserted between a tool call and its result, so
+#     order-validating providers rejected the replayed history. The mempalace
+#     mailbox is outside that precondition — it delivers at `agent_settled`
+#     (idle) with `{deliverAs:"steer"}` and deliberately no `triggerTurn` — and
+#     0.84.4 leaves the documented steer semantics unchanged, so RFC 003 §7.11
+#     still holds. Recorded because the fix is what would make a future mid-run
+#     delivery safe, which is the only reason we would ever change that call.
+# One doc consequence, fixed in this same release: pi's own docs/compaction.md
+# gained exactly one paragraph — the autoCompact threshold is now ALSO checked
+# mid-run, after a tool batch's results are appended. See
+# docs/observational-memory.md §3, which had said compaction is only checked
+# when pi goes idle.
+#
 # AUDITED AT 0.84.3 (2026-08-25, was 0.84.2): upstream's notes carry a
 # "Breaking Changes" heading — `GoogleThinkingLevel` renamed to
 # `GoogleApiThinkingLevel`. INERT FOR THIS IMAGE: all four vendored companions
@@ -69,9 +95,7 @@ ARG USER_NAME=developer
 # `.agents/skills/<group>/` directories were not discovered, and root Markdown
 # files such as README.md / AGENTS.md inside a skill dir were reported as
 # broken skills unless they declared valid skill frontmatter.
-# pi-atelier needs no companion bump: v0.8.2 clears the >=0.7.1 floor that
-# pi >= 0.84 requires (see PI_ATELIER_REF below).
-ARG PI_VERSION=0.84.3
+ARG PI_VERSION=0.84.4
 ARG PI_TOOLKIT_REF=main
 ARG PI_EXTENSIONS_REF=main
 # Repo URLs default to the canonical gitea origin but are overridable so a
@@ -101,15 +125,31 @@ ARG PI_OBSMEM_REF=master
 # pin and PI_VERSION together, checking atelier's CHANGELOG for the pi
 # version it claims to track.
 #
+# AUDITED AT v0.10.0 (2026-08-31, was v0.8.2 — two minor releases): no
+# BREAKING notice in either release, and both are UI-only (Sidebar calm during
+# an active Turn, composer frame + Status Rail, fullscreen-copy-safe Sidebar,
+# Windows path normalisation, Workspace Pulse deferred until pi trusts the
+# project). The one coupling that matters runs the OPPOSITE way to the floor
+# above: v0.9.0 renders the Sidebar as a separate split-layout child and
+# therefore "raises the minimum supported Pi version to 0.84.0", which its
+# peerDependencies do encode this time (`>=0.84.0`, up from `>=0.80.7`).
+# Satisfied with room to spare by PI_VERSION 0.84.4 above — and note that both
+# executable floors (scripts/smoke-test.sh, scripts/recreate-sanity-check.sh)
+# compare with `sort -V`, so 0.10.0 >= 0.7.1 is evaluated correctly rather than
+# as the string comparison that would read 0.10.0 as older than 0.7.1.
+# Pairs deliberately with pi 0.84.4's own fullscreen selection-copy controls:
+# atelier keeps Sidebar content out of the transcript selection, pi adds
+# `fullscreenCopyOnSelect` + Ctrl+X for the selection itself.
+#
 # No `npm install` step, unlike pi-fork/pi-observational-memory/pi-studio:
 # pi-atelier declares ZERO runtime dependencies (only peerDeps, satisfied by
 # the baked pi) and has no build step — pi loads its TypeScript directly from
 # the /opt checkout. Adding an install here would be a no-op that only costs
 # build time.
 ARG PI_ATELIER_REPO=https://github.com/michaelmjhhhh/pi-atelier.git
-ARG PI_ATELIER_REF=v0.8.2
+ARG PI_ATELIER_REF=v0.10.0
 # Human-readable tag PI_ATELIER_REF was resolved from; recorded as a label.
-ARG PI_ATELIER_VERSION=v0.8.2
+ARG PI_ATELIER_VERSION=v0.10.0
 
 RUN set -e && \
     # git_fetch_ref: clone-equivalent helper that accepts EITHER a branch name

README.md

@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ persisted volumes survived, and pi runtime wiring is intact:
 ```bash
 ./scripts/recreate-sanity-check.sh                              # auto-detects variant
 ./scripts/recreate-sanity-check.sh --expected-image-version 1.8.9  # assert the pi-devbox release tag
-./scripts/recreate-sanity-check.sh --expected-version 0.84.3        # assert the pi coding agent version
+./scripts/recreate-sanity-check.sh --expected-version 0.84.4        # assert the pi coding agent version
 ```
 
 Those are **two different versions**, and the flags are not interchangeable:
@@ -1132,9 +1132,9 @@ resolved to `latest` at build time:
 
 | Component | Pin | Where |
 |---|---|---|
-| pi | `0.84.2` | `ARG PI_VERSION` — `Dockerfile.variant` |
-| pi-atelier | `v0.8.2` | `ARG PI_ATELIER_REF` — `Dockerfile.variant` |
-| mempalace | `3.7.1` | `ARG MEMPALACE_VERSION` — `Dockerfile.base` |
+| pi | `0.84.4` | `ARG PI_VERSION` — `Dockerfile.variant` |
+| pi-atelier | `v0.10.0` | `ARG PI_ATELIER_REF` — `Dockerfile.variant` |
+| mempalace | `3.8.0` | `ARG MEMPALACE_VERSION` — `Dockerfile.base` |
 
 The objective is **not** to freeze versions. Bumping is routine — usually one
 line plus a changelog note. The objective is that adopting a new upstream

docs/observational-memory.md

@@ -21,8 +21,9 @@ palace, see
 > Verified on pi-devbox **v1.8.9** (`release_tag v1.8.9`, source `aac4a1c`),
 > which bakes pi-observational-memory **v3.0.4** at commit `ce9fc98` — the value
 > in `/etc/pi-devbox/build-manifest.json` → `components.pi-observational-memory`.
-> Every number below was read from that tree, from pi 0.84.3's own docs, or from
-> the live container.
+> Every number below was read from that tree, from pi's own docs, or from the
+> live container. The pi-side mechanics were first read at pi **0.84.3** and
+> re-checked at **0.84.4** (v1.8.12), which moved one of them — see §3.
 
 ---
 
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ flowchart TD
     S(["agent_settled"]) --> C{"81k tokens<br/>since compacting?"}
     C -- yes --> CP["ctx.compact()"]
     CP --> H(["session_before_compact"])
+    A(["pi autoCompact<br/>idle, or mid-run<br/>after a tool batch"]) --> H
     H --> F["fold the ledger<br/>no model call"]
     F --> VIS["compacted memory"]
 ```
@@ -105,10 +107,16 @@ flowchart TD
   a *successful same-turn* reflection **and** an active pool above
   `observationsPoolTargetTokens` [10000]. Not a third worker on a third
   threshold.
-- **compaction** — `compactAfterTokens` [81000], checked when pi goes idle, so it
-  never interrupts a turn. Pi will also compact on its own when the context is
-  nearly full (`contextTokens > contextWindow - reserveTokens`, `reserveTokens`
-  [16384]).
+- **compaction** — `compactAfterTokens` [81000], checked at `agent_settled`, so
+  *this* trigger never interrupts a turn. Pi will also compact on its own when
+  the context is nearly full (`contextTokens > contextWindow - reserveTokens`,
+  `reserveTokens` [16384]), and **from pi 0.84.4 that check also runs mid-run** —
+  after a tool batch's results are appended, before the next assistant response,
+  skipped only when the batch ends the run and no queued message needs another
+  response. So `session_before_compact` has **two** entry points and the second
+  one can fire *inside* a turn. Harmless for the fold itself, which makes no
+  model call, but worth stating plainly: "never interrupts a turn" was only ever
+  true of the observational-memory trigger, and reads as a promise about pi's.
 
 ## 4. What compaction actually does to your context
 

rootfs/home/developer/.bash_aliases

@@ -116,6 +116,50 @@ if command -v fzf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
   eval "$(fzf --bash)" 2>/dev/null || true
 fi
 
+# cli_utils — shell FUNCTIONS (fgit, fhist, fssh, portcheck, up, mkcd, extract,
+# agents-sync, …). This is the OTHER HALF of the cli_utils wiring, and until
+# v1.8.11 the image shipped only one half. entrypoint-user.sh symlinks the repo's
+# bin/ COMMANDS into ~/.local/bin, which is what makes them resolve in
+# NON-interactive shells (docker exec, agent tool shells, scripts). A symlink
+# cannot carry a shell function, and a function cannot be reached from a
+# non-interactive shell, so the two mechanisms are disjoint and both are
+# required. Nothing sourced the loader: measured 2026-08-30 on v1.8.11, all 14
+# functions were simply missing on a device whose $HOME has no zsh rc — which is
+# the normal case, since the container's interactive shell is bash and zsh is not
+# installed in the image. The image was already paying this layer's dependency
+# cost (fzf, bat, fd, rg, jq are all baked partly FOR these functions) while
+# delivering none of its benefit.
+#
+# Detection order deliberately mirrors the symlink block in entrypoint-user.sh so
+# that commands and functions can never come from two different clones.
+# CLI_UTILS_SOURCE=0 opts out. That is independent of CLI_UTILS_LINK=0 on purpose:
+# they disable independent mechanisms, and someone who wants PATH commands
+# without 14 extra functions in every prompt (or vice versa) should be able to
+# say so.
+#
+# THE LOADER IS BASH-SAFE, MEASURED, NOT ASSUMED: despite every function file
+# being named *.zsh, sourcing cli_utils.sh under `bash --noprofile --norc` exits
+# 0 with no errors and defines all 14, and they run (pathls, mkcd, up, extract,
+# agents-sync, fhist all verified). The single zsh-only construct in the tree
+# (`print -z` in fzf/fhist.zsh) is already guarded by [[ -n $ZSH_VERSION ]] with
+# a bash fallback, and the loader's own header states "bash & zsh compatible".
+# ACCEPTED RISK, stated plainly: /workspace/cli_utils is a HOST BIND MOUNT, so
+# unlike a pinned git ref this content floats outside the image's control. A
+# future cli_utils commit that adds a genuinely zsh-only file would surface as
+# parse errors at every prompt on every device. Errors are left VISIBLE rather
+# than sent to /dev/null so that failure is diagnosable instead of mysterious,
+# and CLI_UTILS_SOURCE=0 is the documented one-line escape hatch.
+if [ "${CLI_UTILS_SOURCE:-1}" != "0" ]; then
+  for _cu in "${CLI_UTILS_CONTAINER_PATH:-}" /workspace/cli_utils "$HOME/cli_utils" /workspace/*/cli_utils; do
+    [ -n "$_cu" ] || continue
+    if [ -r "$_cu/cli_utils.sh" ]; then
+      . "$_cu/cli_utils.sh" || true
+      break
+    fi
+  done
+  unset _cu
+fi
+
 # ── PROMPT_COMMAND: flush history every prompt ───────────────────────
 # Installed AFTER zoxide init so zoxide's hook is already in place;
 # we append with a newline separator to avoid the ';;' parse error

rootfs/usr/local/share/pi-devbox/pi-global-AGENTS.append.md

@@ -70,3 +70,41 @@ rather than merely confusing you:
   local disk, so `mempalace search` can return older and different results than
   the MCP tools while both look correct. Use the MCP tools for the central
   palace; the CLI only for a local one.
+
+## Before you file a finding: second measurement, different route
+
+This is here rather than in a skill because it has to fire *without* a matching
+task description, and because the version of it that lived only in a skill was
+violated five times in one session by an agent that had the skill available.
+
+**Any claim you are about to record as fact — in a drawer, a diary entry, a
+coordination event, or a report to the user — needs a second measurement taken
+by a different route.** Not a re-read of your reasoning: re-reading has caught
+zero of these. A disagreeing measurement has caught all of them.
+
+The two shapes that get filed as fact and are not:
+
+- **A negative result** (`401`, connection refused, zero rows, "not found") is
+  first a claim about *your filter*, not about the world. Wrong host, wrong port,
+  wrong table, capped output.
+- **A positive result** proves only what your command *actually asked*. An SSH
+  handshake can succeed against the wrong host (`ssh -G` tells you which rule
+  captured the name); a `401` can be a real answer from an issuer that never
+  minted the credential.
+
+Cheapest habit that works: **write the expected result next to each check before
+running it**, then diff. Expectations declared up front turn a silent wrong
+assumption into a visible mismatch. And if you cannot think of a second route to
+the same fact, you do not have a finding — you have a hypothesis, so label it as
+one.
+
+## Handling an exposed credential
+
+If a task touches a leaked secret, a token rotation, "is this credential still
+live?", whether to delete stored content, or which scopes a new token needs:
+**read `~/.agents/skills/credential-incident-response/SKILL.md` first.** One rule
+is load-bearing enough to state here: **probe the issuing provider before doing
+anything else** — most "exposed" credentials in a long-lived fleet are already
+dead, and the ones that are live are often far more privileged than assumed.
+Severity first, cleanup second, and prefer **revocation over deletion** for
+anything already replicated.

rootfs/usr/local/share/pi-devbox/skills/VENDORED.md

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ one", which was a bug).
 | skill | owner | how it gets here |
 |-------|-------|------------------|
 | `pi-devbox-environment` | pi-devbox (this repo) | authored here; the canonical copy |
+| `credential-incident-response` | pi-devbox (this repo) | authored here; the canonical copy |
 | `pi-extensions` | the `pi-extensions` package repo (`skill/`) | **vendored fallback** + refreshed at build |
 | `mempalace` | the `skillset` repo | **vendored fallback** (snapshot only) |
 

rootfs/usr/local/share/pi-devbox/skills/credential-incident-response/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+---
+name: credential-incident-response
+description: >-
+  Respond correctly when a live credential is found where it should not be —
+  in a chat transcript, a MemPalace drawer, a log, a git-tracked config, or an
+  agent-authored note. Load this whenever a task involves a leaked/exposed
+  secret, a token rotation, a "is this credential still live?" question, deciding
+  whether to delete or scrub stored content, proving a corpus is clean, or
+  choosing scopes for a new API token. Covers the mandatory order of operations
+  (probe the issuer FIRST — severity before cleanliness), leak-free identity via
+  sha256[:8] fingerprints and when publishing one is safe,
+  why revocation beats deletion for anything already replicated, scopes derived
+  from measured consumers, the three places a secret hides in a Chroma palace, how to prove ABSENCE rather than assume it (instrument strength,
+  census vs class passes, the tokenisation trap where quoting decides detectability, why git filters never run on symlinks, self-tests that abort),
+  where this fleet's secrets live, and what rotation does NOT fix.
+---
+
+# Credential incident response
+
+A leaked credential is a **severity** question before it is a cleanliness
+question. Two days of scrubbing, redaction plumbing and deletion planning were
+once spent on a set of 13 credentials of which **11 were already dead at the
+provider** — a fact that cost five HTTP requests to establish and was never
+checked. Meanwhile the two live ones turned out to be instance-owner **admin**
+tokens, which nobody had looked at either.
+
+## 1. Order of operations — do not reorder this
+
+1. **Is it still accepted?** Probe the issuing provider. Dead credential →
+   hygiene item, stop panicking. Live → incident, continue.
+2. **What can it do?** Read the identity back. `is_admin`, `id=1`, scopes,
+   which account. A read-only repo token and an instance-owner admin token are
+   not the same finding.
+3. **What consumes it?** Grep for real consumers before assuming breakage.
+4. **Where does it live?** Enumerate copies (store, palace, transcripts, git).
+5. **Then** rotate/revoke, and only then consider cleanup.
+
+Doing 4→3→1 in reverse produces confident, wrong severity calls and wasted
+cleanup. If you only have time for one step, do step 1.
+
+## 2. Leak-free identity: fingerprint, never the value
+
+Publishing an 8-hex fingerprint lets you compare a credential across machines,
+files, drawers and peers without ever materialising the secret. Same formula as
+`mempalace_redact.py`:
+
+```sh
+printf '%s' "$SECRET" | sha256sum | cut -c1-8   # printf, NOT echo (no newline)
+printf '%s' 'test' | sha256sum | cut -c1-8      # self-test -> 9f86d081
+```
+
+Report as `(variable, fp, length)`. Equal fingerprints across hosts prove a
+shared credential; that is usually the important part. **Never** paste a live
+value into a search query, a palace drawer, an event body, or a chat message —
+in an agent context your own tool output is itself captured and re-filed.
+
+**Precondition — only fingerprint what an adversary cannot enumerate.** An 8-hex
+fingerprint is 32 bits over its *input space*, so publishing `fp8(x)` hands
+anyone a **membership oracle**: they can test `x == v` for every candidate `v`
+they can generate. For a 40-char random token that space is unreachable. For a
+hostname, username, e-mail, port, path, commit SHA or weak password it is a
+wordlist. **If you can imagine writing the wordlist, you cannot publish the
+fingerprint** — reference those by name and location instead. "High entropy" is
+the usual *sufficient condition*, not the test: a commit SHA is 160-bit and still
+fully enumerable from the repo. `sha256("")` = `e3b0c442` is the degenerate case,
+recognisable on sight precisely because its input space has one member.
+
+**Candidate fingerprints are working memory, never output.** A scanner that hashes
+every token in a file also hashes hostnames, paths and e-mails. Print only
+fingerprints that *matched* a known entry — the tempting debug step when a scan
+returns zero ("print what it saw") publishes low-entropy fingerprints wholesale.
+
+And say plainly what a fingerprint register *is*, so nobody rediscovers it later
+as an alarm: even for an unguessable secret, a published fingerprint is a
+**confirmation oracle** for anyone who already holds a candidate corpus. That is
+exactly how a long-retired token gets identified in old transcripts — and it works
+identically for someone else holding those same files. Net positive, since they
+would already hold the value; state it rather than leaving it implicit.
+
+## 3. Liveness probes, and the trap that scoping creates
+
+```sh
+# Gitea
+curl -sS -m 10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H "Authorization: token $T" \
+  "$GITEA_HOST/api/v1/repos/<owner>/<repo>/actions/runs?limit=1"
+# GitHub
+curl -sS -m 10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H "Authorization: token $T" \
+  https://api.github.com/user
+```
+
+- `200` live · `401` revoked/invalid · **`403` = wrong question, not a dead token**
+- **Probe the issuer that minted it.** A 401 from an unrelated instance says
+  nothing. Resolve the host from config (`GITEA_EGL_HOST` etc.), do not assume.
+- **Under scoped tokens, `/api/v1/user` returns 403 for a perfectly live token**
+  unless `user` scope was granted. So it cannot distinguish *revoked* from
+  *merely scoped*. Use a **repository route the token is authorised for**.
+- Verify **both directions** after a rotation: old → 401, new → 200. The second
+  check is what catches "deleted the wrong token".
+- Port/scheme come from config, not habit: one instance here is
+  `http://gitea.egl.lan:3000` — plain HTTP, with 443 refused.
+
+## 4. Revocation beats deletion — the load-bearing rule
+
+Once revoked, stored copies are **inert**; you may leave them. Deleting them is
+best-effort over an *unbounded* copy set: FTS shadow rows, feed inbox `.jsonl`
+files on every host, sqlite free pages after the delete, mesh replicas that
+already synced, and backups. **Revocation invalidates every copy everywhere at
+once, including copies nobody enumerated.**
+
+So: **rotate + revoke first.** Treat drawer deletion as optional hygiene, never
+as the remedy. Then record the retired fingerprints as *known-dead* so the next
+census recognises them instead of reopening the investigation.
+
+Corollary: never reach for `mempalace_sync` or a bulk `delete_by_source` on a
+shared palace as incident response. High blast radius, low actual benefit.
+
+## 5. Finding a secret in a Chroma palace — three targets, in this order
+
+1. `embedding_fulltext_search_content.c0` — **where document text actually is**
+2. `embedding_metadata.string_value` — metadata fields only
+3. raw byte scan of every `*.sqlite3` — backstop, covers FTS pages and free space
+
+Scanning only (2) is the classic false clean: hundreds of thousands of rows,
+zero hits, and the secret sitting in (1) the whole time. Semantic search proves
+nothing about absence — it returns top-k. For completeness, enumerate by filing
+window (`list_drawers(since=T, before=T+1m)`), since one mine shares a minute.
+
+Value-agnostic sweeps (uuid / 40-hex / `NAME=VALUE`) drown in false positives at
+fleet scale — 608 candidates, mostly session UUIDs and git SHAs. Name-anchoring
+plus entropy plus provenance, applied to **document text**, is what works.
+
+## 6. Proving absence: instrument strength, and four ways a scan lies clean
+
+Section 5's warning is about false *positives* — name-anchoring and provenance are
+what stop a triage sweep drowning in session UUIDs. **A gate is the opposite job.**
+Triage optimises precision; proving absence optimises recall. Every failure below
+reported a reassuring zero over a secret that was really there.
+
+**Rank the instrument, and state which one produced your zero.**
+
+| Instrument | Needs | Blind to |
+|---|---|---|
+| exact-byte value search | you hold the value | nothing — no tokeniser to fool |
+| class/structure pass | a header pattern | anything without a recognisable shape |
+| fingerprint census | a fingerprint list | any secret not listed; tokenisation |
+
+A census is deliberately value-free, so it must *extract candidates and hash them*
+— which makes its sensitivity a property of the tokeniser, not of the corpus. If
+you hold the value, search the bytes instead, and search the value's JSON-escaped
+rendering too when the corpus is `.jsonl`.
+
+**1. Census and class answer different questions; neither substitutes.** A census
+answers *"has a KNOWN secret leaked?"*, a class pass *"is there secret-SHAPED
+material here?"* Both failure modes were measured on this fleet: a class-only
+pre-commit hook passed plaintext UUID API credentials to a shared repo twice,
+because a UUID carries no key header — while a census-only gate reported 0 hits
+with freshly-synced SSH private keys and an age identity in the tree, because no
+key is in the census. Run both passes.
+
+**2. Tokenisation — quoting alone can decide detectability.** Maximal-run
+extraction swallows the value of an *unquoted* assignment:
+
+```
+PROXMOX_SECRET=<uuid>       # ONE run; the uuid is never hashed alone  -> MISS
+export SECRET="<uuid>"      # the quote ends the run; bare uuid hashed -> HIT
+```
+
+Take the **union** of three strategies, because each fails in a different
+direction — (2) is the one that recovers the unquoted case:
+
+~~~python
+runs  = re.findall(r'[^\s"\'`]{12,}', text)          # 1. maximal runs
+split = [p for r in runs for p in re.split(r'[=!,;:@|()\[\]{}<>]', r) if len(p) >= 12]
+shape = re.findall(UUID_RE, text) + re.findall(r'[0-9a-f]{32,64}', text)
+candidates = set(runs) | set(split) | set(shape)
+~~~
+
+**3. Scan the index or the pushed tree, never the working tree.** The working tree
+is not what gets published. And for an rsync-published mirror a repo-only fix is
+not weaker, it is *temporary*: the next sync re-publishes the live disk. Fix the
+live file first, verify it clean **by fingerprint**, then sync. Read blobs with
+`git ls-tree -r <sha>` plus one `git cat-file --batch` (thousands of `git show`
+calls is the slow way).
+
+**4. Git filters never run on symlinks — and `check-attr` will not tell you.** A
+symlink's blob is the *target path*, so `filter=git-crypt` can never encrypt it,
+yet `git check-attr filter` cheerfully answers `git-crypt` for that path. **A
+symlinked secret stays plaintext no matter what `.gitattributes` says.** Join the
+attribute against the **file mode** (`git ls-files -s`, mode `120000`) and verify
+the index blob really begins `\0GITCRYPT\0`. Report encrypted / symlinked /
+scanned as three separate numbers and assert they sum — encrypted and symlinked
+blobs are *skipped*, not certified clean.
+
+**Self-test two-sided, and abort if it cannot discriminate.** Require a synthetic
+positive to fire AND a negative to stay silent before trusting any zero. Keep the
+fixtures in *structurally separate buffers*: put a quoted and an unquoted probe in
+one buffer and the quote terminates the run, handing the bare token to the weak
+extractor and making it look as strong as the union — a self-test artifact that
+has already fooled an agent here. And never gate on `$?` when the tool has a
+lock-skip or no-op path that also exits 0; judge the reported line.
+
+**Row-gone is not bytes-gone.** A correct sqlite `DELETE` leaves the payload in
+freelist pages until `VACUUM`, so deletion effectiveness is *two* numbers: rows
+removed, and a raw byte scan of the `.sqlite3`. One aggregate figure reported as
+"erased" has only measured "unretrievable".
+
+## 7. Choosing scopes: derive them from measured consumers
+
+Before creating a replacement token, find out what actually uses it:
+
+```sh
+git -C <repo> remote get-url origin        # ssh:// ? then git needs NO token
+git config --global --list | grep -iE 'credential|insteadof'   # and no helper?
+grep -rhoE 'api/v1/[A-Za-z0-9/{}$_.-]+' <consumers>  | sort -u  # exact routes
+grep -rhoE '\-X [A-Z]+' <consumers>                             # any writes?
+```
+
+Real outcome here: git used SSH keys throughout, and the token's only consumer
+read three CI-run routes with `GET`. So `repository: Read` and nothing else
+replaced two admin tokens. **Scoping shrinks the blast radius of the next leak
+far more than any redaction pipeline does** — a read-only token in a transcript
+is a hygiene event, not an instance compromise.
+
+Then prove the scope with an acceptance suite that declares expectations first:
+must-work routes → `200`; `/admin/*`, `/user`, `/user/repos` → `403`.
+
+## 8. What rotation does *not* fix
+
+- **A cleartext channel.** If the endpoint is `http://`, the *new* token is
+  exposed identically from first use. Raise TLS separately.
+- **Git history.** A secret committed and pushed cannot be fixed by any store or
+  palace operation — it needs rotation *and* history surgery.
+- **Agent-authored content.** Stage-write redactors see transcripts only, never
+  `add_drawer` / `checkpoint` / `diary_write` output. Never type a secret into
+  the palace yourself; nothing downstream will catch it.
+- **Plaintext/encrypted drift.** Gitignored plaintext `.env` files go stale while
+  `.env.age` moves on, so old values linger on disk (and in backups) long after
+  rotation. They are a common source of "mystery" fingerprints in a census.
+
+## 9. This fleet's secret store (verify, do not assume)
+
+- All `*.env.age` live in **one** repo: `joakimp/docker-compose-repo`. `myconfigs`
+  has none.
+- Every `.age` file has **one X25519 recipient** — a single key tracked in
+  `myconfigs` under git-crypt. Unlocking git-crypt therefore decrypts the entire
+  fleet's secrets, including hosts you have no access to. The age layer adds no
+  isolation beyond git-crypt.
+- Flow: `./fetch-secrets.sh <host>` (decrypt → `.env`) → edit → `./encrypt-secrets.sh <host>`
+  → commit → push → `docker compose up -d --force-recreate`.
+- **Always pass the host argument** to `encrypt-secrets.sh`. Bare, it walks the
+  whole tree and re-encrypts every `.env` it finds, re-nonced, including stale
+  ones — silently rolling back other hosts' secrets.
+- After any re-encrypt, check the header still shows exactly **one X25519
+  recipient**; a hand-rolled `age -r` locks the rest of the fleet out, and the
+  failure only appears on another machine, later.

rootfs/usr/local/share/pi-devbox/skills/pi-devbox-environment/SKILL.md

@@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ mine:
 | "`tor-ms22` is not in the SSH config" | `grep … \| head -20` — the entry was at **line 454**. `~/.ssh/config` here is ~500 lines. |
 | "the Docker host has no `docker`" | non-interactive SSH `PATH` lacks `/usr/local/bin` (§2, §3). It was at `/usr/local/bin/docker`. |
 | "no ControlMaster is running" | pattern `ssh ` (trailing space) cannot match a master: those processes **rename themselves** to `ssh: <controlpath> [mux]`. |
+| "the credential is not in the palace" | scanned `embedding_metadata.string_value` only. Drawer **text** lives in `embedding_fulltext_search_content.c0`; 554k metadata rows proved nothing. |
+| "this token is dead — 401" | probed it against the **wrong issuer**. A 401 from an instance that never issued the credential is not evidence about the credential. |
+| "that host is unreachable, can't test" | tried ports 443 and 80. It was on **3000**, and the env var I already held (`GITEA_EGL_HOST`) stated the scheme and port. |
+| "this repo has no `## Unreleased` convention" | read `CHANGELOG.md` **once**, minutes after a release commit had renamed that section to a version heading. 33 commits touch `## Unreleased`. A snapshot cannot show you a cycle. |
 
 Habits that would have caught all three:
 
@@ -155,10 +159,55 @@ ssh -F "$HOME/.ssh-local/config" mac 'command -v docker || ls /usr/local/bin/doc
 
 # match a process's ACTUAL argv, not the name you imagine
 ps -eo pid,etime,args | grep -Ei 'mux|mosh|ssh'
+
+# to learn a repeating PROCESS or convention, read history, not the file. A
+# file's current content is one frame of a cycle, and the frame you happen to
+# catch may be the one where the thing you are looking for was just consumed.
+git log -S'## Unreleased' -- CHANGELOG.md         # not `head -60 CHANGELOG.md`
 ```
 
-A positive result needs no such scepticism — it carries its own evidence. Only
-absence has to be *earned*, so spend the extra command there.
+Absence has to be *earned*, so spend the extra command there.
+
+### …and a positive result only proves what you *actually asked*
+
+An earlier version of this section claimed "a positive result needs no such
+scepticism — it carries its own evidence." **That is false, and believing it
+cost a later session three more wrong findings.** A positive result is evidence
+about the question your command really posed, which may not be the question you
+meant. The failure is invisible precisely *because* the command succeeded.
+
+| Claim | The command succeeded — at answering something else |
+|---|---|
+| "EGL git over SSH works" | `ssh git@gitea.egl.lan` greeted me as `joakimp`. `~/.ssh/config` had `Host gitea*` → `HostName gitea.jordbo.se`, so I authenticated **to the wrong instance**. The real EGL account is `ecsjper`. |
+| "the port config regressed" | compared `ssh -G` output against `2222` — a value produced by **my own earlier `-p 2222` flag**, not by the config. I reported the user's edit as a regression it never caused. |
+| "the CI runners authenticate with this token" | pure fabrication, contradicted by my own scan output already on screen. The runners use per-runner `REGISTRATION_TOKEN`. |
+
+Two habits that actually catch this class, both cheap:
+
+```sh
+# 1. ask which RULE captured your hostname before trusting any ssh result.
+#    ssh_config is first-obtained-value-wins PER KEYWORD, not per block: a
+#    specific block only wins the keywords it declares, so a later `Host gitea*`
+#    still supplies HostName unless the specific block restates it.
+ssh -G git@thehost | grep -E '^(hostname|port|user|identityfile)'
+
+# 2. state the expected result BEFORE running the check, and diff against it.
+#    This is the single technique that separated the one verification that went
+#    right (10/10, expectations declared per probe) from five that went wrong
+#    (results interpreted after the fact, each time in the direction I expected).
+probe "/repos/.../actions/runs" 200   # must work
+probe "/admin/users"            403   # must be denied
+```
+
+And the meta-observation, which is the reason this subsection exists: across all
+five errors, **not one was caught by re-reading my own reasoning.** Every one was
+caught by a second measurement that disagreed — the SSH lie surfaced only because
+the greeting said `joakimp` while a token probe minutes earlier had said
+`ecsjper`; the fabrication surfaced only because the user read my own output back
+to me. So the operational rule is not "be careful". It is: **for a load-bearing
+claim, produce a second measurement by a different route, and expect it to
+disagree.** If you cannot think of a second route, you do not yet have a finding
+— you have a hypothesis.
 
 **`dscp`/`scp` with accented filenames on a macOS host.** macOS stores filenames
 in Unicode **NFD** (decomposed — e.g. `ä` is `a` + combining U+0308), while the

scripts/smoke-test.sh

@@ -245,6 +245,8 @@ run "socat"           "socat -V"
 run "studio-expose helper" "test -x /usr/local/bin/studio-expose"
 run "image-baked pi-devbox-environment skill" \
     "test -f /usr/local/share/pi-devbox/skills/pi-devbox-environment/SKILL.md"
+run "image-baked credential-incident-response skill" \
+    "test -f /usr/local/share/pi-devbox/skills/credential-incident-response/SKILL.md"
 run "global-AGENTS append snippet present" \
     "test -f /usr/local/share/pi-devbox/pi-global-AGENTS.append.md"
 run "pi-devbox block merged into pi-global-AGENTS.md" \
@@ -596,9 +598,9 @@ exec_test "mempalace skill linked (fallback)"      'test -L $HOME/.agents/skills
 # bumped correctly but whose bytes came from the wrong place.
 exec_test "mempalace skill snapshot is current"    'f=$HOME/.agents/skills/mempalace/SKILL.md; grep -q "Provenance is stamped for you" "$f" && ! grep -q "Attribute what you file yourself" "$f" && echo ok'
 # Link TARGETS, not just link existence: with no skillset mounted (as here) the
-# baked tree must be what resolves, for all three vendored skills.
+# baked tree must be what resolves, for all four vendored skills.
 exec_test "vendored skills resolve to the baked tree (no skillset mounted)" \
-    'for s in mempalace pi-extensions pi-devbox-environment; do
+    'for s in mempalace pi-extensions pi-devbox-environment credential-incident-response; do
        case "$(readlink -f $HOME/.agents/skills/$s)" in
          /usr/local/share/pi-devbox/skills/$s) ;;
          *) echo "$s resolves to $(readlink -f $HOME/.agents/skills/$s)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
@@ -612,7 +614,7 @@ exec_test "vendored skills resolve to the baked tree (no skillset mounted)" \
 exec_test "pi-devbox-version reports skill sources (all baked, no skillset here)" \
     'out=$(pi-devbox-version)
      echo "$out" | grep -q "skills:" || { echo "no skills section" >&2; exit 1; }
-     for s in mempalace pi-extensions pi-devbox-environment; do
+     for s in mempalace pi-extensions pi-devbox-environment credential-incident-response; do
        echo "$out" | grep -qE "^    $s +baked$" \
          || { echo "$s not reported as baked" >&2; exit 1; }
      done; echo ok'